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1.

SUMMARY:

These petitions raise numerous issues relating

to implied private right of actions under Rule lOb-S, promulgated
pursuant to§ lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

In 1969, Texas International

Speedway, Inc. (TIS) filed a registration statement and
prospectus with the SEC and the Texas State Securities Board.
TIS's securities offering totalled over $4 million, the proceeds
of which were to be used to construct an automobile race track.
One year later, TIS filed a petition for bankruptcy.

In 1972,

petrs in No. 81-1076 filed a class action on behalf of purchasers
of TIS securities under Rule lOb-S, and a pendant claim pursuant
to the Texas Securities Act.

~

The factual dispute in the case

focused on statements made in the TIS prospectus.

The jury

0
~~

ultimately found that the prospectus was materially misleading

•~~
~-

~

to the cost of constructing the speedway and that the defendants
had failed to disclose the true facts with t }eckless disregard for

----

,,

the truth.

Prior to trial, the class compromised its claims

against the underwriters of the offering and the speedway
contractor.

The remaining

~nts,

~

resps in No. 81-1076,

~
apparently are the accounting firm and the accountants who helped J.l5 ~

prepare the prospectus.

-

~'3

The amounts received in settlement were

----- ----------~

credited against the judgment eventually obtained by the
plaintiffs, but the non-settling defendants' cross claims for
contribu~ n

were disallowed.

The CA reversed.

The CA first held that a private right of

action under Rule lOb-S may be implied despite the applicability
.----r
of express civil remedies. The CA noted that this question was

-

3 -

reserved by the Supreme Court in Blue ChiE StarnEs v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.SA. 723, 7S2 n. lS (197S)' and Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 42S

u.s.

18S, 211 n. 31 (1976) .

Although recent

u~
u.d-,

-s ltJ-6--b'

decisions by the Supreme Court give substance to the argument
that no remedy should be implied for actions covered by express
liability provisions of a statute, this is not a case where the
court is being asked to create a new judicial remedy.

It is well

established that a private remedy exists under Rule lOb-S.

The

question is thus whether an established remedy may be invoked
despite the existence of another remedy for the same conduct.
While

§§

11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act contain limitations and

requirements not exacted of Rule lOb-S litigants, allowing
invocation of the Rule lOb-S remedy does not impermissably
nullify these constraints.

The implied remedy under Rule lOb-S

7

should not depend on whether the statement relied upon was or was
not contained in an SEC filing.

In this regard, the CA relied on

wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing CorE·t
6SO F.2d 342 (CA DC 1980), cert. denied

(1981)~

u.s.

~-

~

Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d S4S (2nd Cir. 1979), cert.
denied 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
The CA then examined the elements of a cause of action under
Rule lOb-S.

/"""/
if. , . l
~ ~

I•

Inter alia, the CA held that the clear and

~o~vincing ~dence

standard ' is required in a Rule lOb-S action.

The court relied on the fact that the traditional burden of proof ~
in common-law fraud cases is the clear and convincing standard.

.J,

~

Next, the CA held that it was error for the DC not to require the
\ ._-

plaintiffs to demonstrate reliance and causation.

&A-~

Although in~ -J-!'~

/J,~~L

- 4 Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406

u.s.

128

(1972) , the Court relieved the investor in certain circumstances
of the necessity of providing affirmatively that he relied on the
prospectus or other representation, it does not eliminate the
reliance element from a Rule lOb-5 case.

Where it is alleged

that a defendant has made positive misrepresentations of

mat~ ~

~

information, proof of reliance by the plaintiff upon the
misrepresentation is required.

On the other hand, where a

~.

plaintiff alleges deception by the defendant's nondisclosure

of ~

material information, the Affiliated Ute presumption obviates the
need to prove actual reliance on the omitted information.

The

relates only to the whether proof of reliance is a prerequisite
to recovery (misrepresentation case) or whether proof of
The

CA then held that this case cannot be characterized as a
nondisclosure case.

The defendants did not stand mute in the

face of a duty to disclose.

They undertook instead to disclose

relevant information in an offering statement now alleged to
contain certain misstatements of fact and to fail to contain
other facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances, not misleading.

This is not a case in which

difficulties of proof of reliance require the application of the
Affiliated Ute presumptions.
The CA also found that there is a right to contribution in
Rule lOb-5 actions.

~~

~
~v

difference between misrepresentation and nondisclosure cases

nonreliance is an affirmative defense (nondisclosure case).

•-

The court noted that of the seven express

civil remedies provided in the federal securities laws, three

- 5 -

expressly provide for contribution.

A no-contribution rule

promotes a rush to settlement while contribution provides a more
equal distribution of justice.
The CA held that the evidence was insufficient to support
the jury's finding that the defendants were "sellers" under the
Texas Securities Act.

The Texas Securities Act creates liability

on the part of any person who offers or sells a security by means
of any untrue statement of a material fact.

In Brown v. Cole,

291 S.W.2d 704 (1956), the Texas Supreme Court defined the term
"sell" as meaning any act by which a sale is made.

Nevertheless,

in Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), the
court distinguished Brown v. Cole as a case involving an active
negotiator whose efforts resulted in the sale.

The Stone court

limited the term "seller" to the actual seller and one who acts
as an agent for either the buyer or seller.

This decision

effectively limits the Texas Securities Act to those who are
actively engaged in the sale process and prevents it from
reaching those who merely participate in preparing an offering.
There is no evidence that resps in No. 81-1076 participated in
instigating the actual sales transactions to any member of the
plaintiff class.

The two class representatives testified that

they purchased TIS securities on the open market and not from the
corporate issuer.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr in No. 81-680 asks this Court to

grant cert on the issue of whether an implied remedy exists under

(

Rule lOb-S in favor of purchasers of securities who have an
express remedy under

§

11 of the Securities Act of 1933.

In the

- 6 -

instant case, plaintiffs had a
to become time-barred.

§

11 remedy which they permitted

The CA's reasoning assumes it to be the

proper function of the federal courts to find implied remedies
where necessary to fill out the statutory scheme.

This view has

been emphatically rejected by this Court in Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979).

The most serious problem

with the decision below, however, is its failure to heed the
repeated teachings of this Court that federal courts should not
imply remedies in those instances where express remedies are
provided by Congress for the same conduct.
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,

See, e.g., Northwest

______u.s. ______

(1981); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.

Nationa~ea

Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
Resps in No. 81-680 .argue
that 3 CAs, including the court
,..
below, have recently concluded that the existence of express
remedies under the securities laws does no_t preclude the implied
remedy under Rule lOb-5.
Robbins, supra.

See Wachovia Bank, supra; A. H.

Petr does not -cite any decision by any other CA

adopting a contrary

~ule.

Moreover, this Court has held in the

past that the overlap between Rule lOb-5 and other provisions of
the federal securities laws is not a reason for excluding the
Rule lOb-5 remedy.

u.s. 453 (1969)

(§

See SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393
14 of Securities Exchange Act).

An implied

private right of action under Rule lOb-5 is well established.

A

Rule lOb-5 plaintiff must prove facts not necessary for recovery
under

§

11 -- deceit committed with scienter.

Second, Rule lOb-5

- 7 applies to all misrepresentations whereas

§

11 applies only to

misstatements in a registration statement.
Petrs in No. 81-1076 raise five issues.

First, petrs

contend that the proper standard of proof is an important
question of federal securities law on which a split of authority
exists among the CAs.

Petrs cite to numerous decisions which

petr asserts holds that the preponderance standard is the
appropriate standard in a Rule lOb-S action.

See Mihara v. Dean

Whitter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824-25 (9th Cir. 1980)

~

Dzenitz v.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner & Smith, 494 F.2d 168, 171 n. 2
(lOth Cir. 1974).

The determination of the appropriate standard

of proof requires the balancing of interests in order to allocate
the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the
relevant

i~portance

v. Texas, 441

u.s.

attached to the ultimate decision.
418, 423 (1979).

Addington

The possible opprobrium to a

defendant that may result from an adverse decision clearly falls
far short of the extraordinary interests that warrant the clear
and convincing standard of proof.
Second, petrs argue that the CA's decision conflicts with
decisions of other CA's with regard to whether petrs bear the
burden of proving that they relied upon the material
misrepresentations and half truths contained in the TIS
prospectus.

There is a presumption of reliance whenever the

defendant's fraudulent conduct affects the market in which the
plaintiff purchased or sold his securities.
(

Blakie v. Barrack,

524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429

u.s.

\

(1976)~

''

Herbst v. ITT, 495 F.2d 1308 (2nd Cir. 1974).

A

816

- 8 -

presumption of reliance is justified on the ground that material
representations and half-truths in a registration statement and
prospectus are inevitably reflected in a decision of an
underwriter to market a security and generally in the market
price of publicly traded securities.

It is also justified by the

impracticalities of proving individual reliance whenever large
numbers of investors have been defrauded.

Petrs also contend

that the presumption of reliance should apply in cases involving
half-truths.

Half-truths present as severe an evidentiary hurdle

for a plaintiff as with omissions.

Moreover, the omission of a

material fact from a prospectus creates a half-truth.

In the

case at bar, the jury found that resps had failed to disclose the
cost of completing the speedway and the financial condition of
the company.

Each of these failures to disclose involves both a

misrepresentation and an omission.

Four CAs have upheld a

presumption of reliance in cases involving half-truths.

See

Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 558 (1st Cir. 1978): Sharp v.
Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 187-189 (3rd Cir. 1981): Chelsea
Associates v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975): Continental
Grain v. Pacific Oil Seats, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 411-412 n. 1 (8th
Cir. 1979).
Third, petrs contend that the decision below requires the
plaintiff to bear the burden to prove his own lack of
culpability.

Fourth, petrs ask this Court to resolve whether

defendant in a Rule lOb-S case should be entitled to a right of
contribution.

In two recent cases, this Court has held that in

the absence of an express provision for contribution made part of

- 9 -

a remedial statute, Congress did not intend to give federal
courts the broad power to fashion a right to contribution.
Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
(1981)~

u.s.

See

U.S. ------

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,
(1981).

Finally, petrs contend that the CA ignored a

controlling decision by the Tex.
a lower Texas court.

s.

Ct. in favor of a decision by

The court below chose to ignore Brown v.

Cole and relied on the decision of a middle-level Tex. App. Ct.
in Stone v. Enstam.

Under Texas state law, decisions of the

Texas civil appeals court are not binding on other courts unless
the decision has been reviewed by the Tex. S. Ct.

Because of its

no writ history, Stone v. Enstam would not bind another Texas
appellate court.
The State of Texas has filed an amicus brief supporting
petrs' contentions regarding the Texas Securities Act in No. 811076.

4.

DISCUSSION:

Only two of the issues raised in these

petitions can be characterized as substantial.

Both parties

agree that this Court has never decided whether a remedy may be
implied under Rule lOb-S where an express statutory remedy
already exists.

This Court, however, recently denied review on

two cases raising this issue.

Unlike A. H. Robbins and Wachovia

Bank, however, there can be no doubt that the plaintiffs in this
case would have had an action under

§

11 of the 1933 Act but for

their failure to comply with the statute of limitations.

In

Wachovia and A. H. Robbins, there was considerable doubt as to
whether the express statutory remedies were applicable to the

- 10 it is at least arguable that

challenged transactions.
I

there is a conflict among the CAs as to whether the preponderance
or clear and convincing standard applies in a Rule lOb-5 action.
The cases cited by petr in No. 81-1076 apply the preponderance
standard, but none rejects the clear and convincing standard.

As

to the reliance/causation issue, the CAs appear to agree that
reliance is required in a Rule lOb-5 action alleging
misrepresentations.
characterization.

The problem in this case is merely one of
Whether this case should be characterized as

one involving misrepresentations or nondisclosure would not
appear to be certworthy.

Although the rationale of Radcliff

certainly calls into question the CA's decision that contribution
may be allowed in a Rule lOb-5 case, the plaintiffs are hardly
the proper party to bring this issue to this Court.

Unlike petrs

in No. 81-1076, I find nothing in the CA's opinion that requires
the plaintiff to prove that he exercised due care.

Finally, even

if the CA improperly applied Texas law, this is not a certworthy
issue.

The decision will have absolutely no effect even on CA

5's interpretation of the Texas Securities Act if a Texas court
disapproves the interpretration applied by this decision.
I

recommend a CFR in No. 81-1076, if the Court is interested

in the evidentiary standard issue.
No. 81-680.

A response has been filed in

No response has been filed in 81-1076.

~

1/15/82
CMS

Dunkelman

Op in petn.

No. 81- lo?t.
Responses have been received.

Generally

they reinforce the conclusion of the
pool memo that this ·xes«i,BfBxp*U

-

LK

petition properly presents only one

-

issue of arguable certworthiness : Whether

-

the "preponderance" or "clear and
convincing" standard should apply in a
Rule lOb-5 action.
latter.

CAS opted for the

There is a split.

If the Court grants on this issue-respondents suggest that it might wish to
await developments in the circuits--the
grant should be limited to Question 1.
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February 19, 1982 Conference
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Huddleston, et al., v. Herman & MacLean, et. a1., No. 81-1076
Questions Presented
1.

(No. 81-680) Does an implied cause of action under §lO(b)

of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or under §17(a) of the 1933
Act exist for the benefit of the purchasers of securities who have

Secu~ it~es

an express remedy under §11 of the
Act of 1933?
-2.
(No. 81-1076) Is the clear and convincing standard

appropriate burden of proof in private §lO(b) actio::;;

~

~~~
tr(

the ~

~

case is determining exactly what the first issue presented is.

The

CA found without discussion, and the cert memo assumed, that "the
alleged misrepresentations in the prospectus would also warrant a
suit Under Sections 11 and 12(2) ."

131.4-f

"

Only one of the four material

misrepresentations or omissions in the prospectus, however, clear!
is an "expertised" statement that gives rise to an express cause o
action under §11 (a) (4).

See 15

u.s.c. §77k (a) (4) (accountant is

liable for material misstatements only "with respect to the
statement ... which purports to have been prepared or certified by
him")

(emphasis added).

Both parties agree that pltfs had

----

~o

complete §11 remedy for the misrepresentations alleged here.
~

------------

The parties, amici curiae, and the SG raise and discuss three
main issues, and this memo will at least briefly analyze each:

~, it addresses whether a private §lO(b) remedy exists. ~
assuming a private §lO(b) remedy exists, it discusses whether the
action should be limited to remedying violations that are not
actually actionable under an express remedy.

~, again assuming

there is a private §lO(b) remedy, the memo will discuss whether
purchasers of registered securities may pursue their remedy against
experts under §lO(a) rather than §11.
Pltfs in the DC also sought relief pursuant to §17(a) of the

~ \il0'

Securities Act of 1933, but the CA did not rely on or address
§17 (a).

~~w>- action

Pltfs concede that the existence of an implied cause of
under that section is not an issue in this case.

Discussion
I.
A.
1. Precedent.

Implied Cause of Action

Existence of Section lO(b) Remedy
As plaintiffs point out, although

~urt

never itself decided the existence of a private

§lO(b)~emedy,

has, in many opinions, affirmed its existence.

See, e.

Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425

u.s. 185, 196 (1976) (POWELL,

has
it

g., ~ rnst

J.)

&

("well

established"); ~ ue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
730 (1975)

(POWELL, J., joining)

("confirmed")

(cited in

Hochfelder); Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co • ,
--

4_..,.
0 4 U. S . 6 , 13 n . 9 (19 71 )

("It is now established that a

private right of action is implied under §lO(b) .")
Hochfelder).

(cited in

The SG contends that, because the private right of

action under §lO(b) is so well rooted in federal jurisprudence, the
Court need not inquire whether that right is congruent with recent
decisions evaluating other implied remedies.

See Touche Ross & Co.

v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 n.l9 (1979).

Deft, on the other

hand, suggests that the implied right under §lO(b) is an historical
anachronism and should be given the usually strict scrutiny given
any implied right of action.

~he

9 ~~

existence of a private §lO(b) action is for your information

only if you do not feel bound by precedent on this point.

~~

v. University of Chicago, 441

~~(POWELL,
~

1 ~k

The abbreviated discussion below on

J., dissenting)

Co. v.] Borak[, 377
2.

u.s.

Cf.

677, 736 n.6 (1979)

("I do not suggest overruling [J.I. Case

u.s. 426 (1964)] at this late date .... ").

Legislative Reenactment Doctrine.

The "central inquiry" in

deciding whether a private remedy may be implied is congressional

intent.
however, depending whether a court considers new legislation or
legislation that Congress amended following its enactment.

Compare

Merrill Lynch, 102 S.Ct., at 1839 ("When Congress enacts new
legislation, the question is whether Congress intended to create a
private remedy ..•• "}, with id.

(" [W]hen Congress acts in a statutory

context in which an implied private remedy has already been
recognized by the courts .•• the inquiry ... is whether Congress
intended to preserve the preexisting remedy."}."

~ ~

In Merrill Lynch, the Court upheld the implied remedy under an

~ a~al~s
.?

Jt'

~

antifraud provision of the Commodity Exchange Act even

though "the consensus of opinion concerning the existence of a

~

private cause of action under the CEA was neither as old nor as

VV

overwhelming as the consensus concerning §10 (b} •••• "

Id. , at 18 40.

The SG argues that Congress has reaffirmed the private §lO(b} action
~

three times in the last twenty years:

(1} in the Securities Acts

Amendments of 1964; (2} in the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975;
and (3} in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977}.

On the other

hand, the Court in Merrill Lynch commented that "no comparable
legislative approval or acquiescence exists for the Rule lOb-5
remedy."

102 s.ct., at 1845 n.88.

694 n.ll (1980}

Cf. Aaron v. SEC, 446 u.s. 680,

(holding that the legislative consideration of [the

1975 amendments and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977] do
not confirm the SEC's construction of §lO(b}}.

The legislative

reenactment doctrine is thus not conclusive, although it could most
strongly support a finding of "reenactment."

See Merrill Lynch, 102

u.s., at 1846 n.92 ("'The statutes enacted in 1933 and 1934 have

'

,.

been amended so often with full congressional awareness of the
judicial interpretation of Rule lOb-5 as implicitly creating a
private remedy that we must now assume that Congress intended to
create rights for the specific beneficiaries as well as duties to be
policed by the SEC."')
Inc., 430
3.

u.s.

{quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries,

1, 55 n.4 {1977)

Cort Analysis.

{STEVENS, J., dissenting}}.

Pltfs admit that there is no direct

evidence of congressional intent to create any private remedy under
§lO{b).

See Blue Chip Stamps, 421

u.s.,

at 729-732, 737.

structure of the 1933 Act, including §§16 and 18, 15

u.s.c.

The
§77p,r

{preserving state and common-law remedies), offer little support
that Congress intended a private federal remedy to duplicate the
express remedies.
4. Conclusion.

The Court has generally "assumed" the existence

~· --~~of a §lO{b) cause of action.

See Aaron, 446

u.s.,

at 689.

~ ."[W]hether a cause of action exists" is a question the answer to
· .1/
~

. . .wh1'
.
ch "may be assumed without being decided."

~.s.

t~ VV~he

471, 476 n.S (1979).

B.
~

Preemption by Express Remedy

The precise issue on which cert was granted--whether an action

made a violation of the 1933 Act for which an express remedy is

~~provided
~

The Court should do likewise regarding

issue whether a private §lO{b} issue exists.

y.;f

~

Burks v. Lasker, 441

may serve as a basis for an

imp~ied

action under SlO(b) of

the 1934 Act--is one that the Court presumably left open in Blue
Chip Stamps, 421

u.s.,

u.s.,

at 211 n.31.

at 733 n.l5, and again in Hochfelder, 425

The answer to the question is important: section

lO{b} potentially overlaps with a ........substantial number of express
~

,_

?i::i:on~~

securities laws, including

§§1::

and 12(2) of the 1933 Act and §§9(e) and 18 of the 1934 Act.
1.

The Court's Preemption Test.

In Blue Chip Stamps, the

Court acknowledged that when an express remedy is provided the Court
should be reluctant to find for the same conduct a more expansive

(< S

implied cause of action: "It would indeed be anomalous to impute to

uJH ~Congress

~~mplied
~

an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially

cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for

comparable express causes of action."
Ross, 442

u.s.,

421 U.S., at 736.

See Touche

at 574 ("(W]e are extremely reluctant to imply a

cause of action ••. that is significantly broader than the remedy that

~

Congress chose to provide.").

In no ~ ..ha :_ t~ Court recognized('RU4if

~ an imp~lied~a-te S ~ where
~-~~ ~able under the federal securities
/

there_w!:'
laws.

a::'.-..exJ2!ess~dy ~

This Court, however,

has also emphasized that express remedies do not by themselves
negate additional implied remedies.
at 711; Cort v. Ash, 422

u.s.

See, e. g., Cannon, 441

66, 83 n.l4 (1975).

u.s.,

Indeed, many

§lO(b) actions have arisen from fraudulent conduct associated with
registered offerings.
Fraud

&

See 1 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities

Commodities Fraud §§2.4(2), 2.4(4)

(1982)

(collecting

cases) •
Plaintiffs primarily rely on this Court's analysis in
Hochfelder, which rested in part on the premise that actions under
,,

~t

§lO(b) depend

on~

precisely because conduct

actionable under §§11 and 12(2) also is actionable in a private suit
under §lO(b).

See 425

u.s.,

at 210-211 (citing Fischman v. Raytheon

Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-787 (CA2 1951)

(upholding private §lO(b)

_/

action by

stockh(~u~L~

statement)).

I~~
---4 11::7 ¢-56-for fraudulent statements in registration

u.s.

In SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393

453

{1969) , the Court stated that "the existence or nonexistence of
regulation under §14 would not affect the scope of §lO{b) and Rule
lOb-5 ••••

The fact that there may well be some overlap is neither

unusual nor unfortunate."

Id., at 468.

/1

\

Pltfs overlook, however,

that in National Securities the Commission acted pursuant to the

Court observed that National Securities presented "none of the
complications which may arise in determining who, if anyone, may
bring private actions under §lO{b) and Rule lOb-5."

393

u.s.,

at

467 n.9.
It is important to identify what factors will inform any
judgment whether the existence of express remedies preempt §lO{b)
remedies.

Pltfs argue that the question here is not what the 1934

Congress intended, but what Congress would intend had it known that
eight years later the courts would imply a private §lO{b) remedy.
In Touch Ross, the Court stated that, in implying a right of action,
"[t]he ultimate question is one of congressional intent[.]"

u.s.,

at 578.

442

See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National

, Sea Clammers Association, 453

u.s.

1, 13 {1981)

{POWELL, J.).

It is

certainly arguable, however, that congressional intent is beside the
point now, because Congress never intended the §lO{b) remedy in the
first instance.

See Blue Chip Stamps, 421

u.s.,

at 749 {because

§lO{b) action "has been judicially found to exist," the Court is
free in "judicially delimit[ing]" it to rely upon "practical
factors" and "considerations of policy").

See also Merrill Lynch,

8.

102 s.ct., at 1846 n.92 {because §lO{b) private remedy must now be
assumed, defining its scope does not "present the same kind of issue
discussed in Cort")
J., dissenting)).

{quoting Piper, 430 u.s., at 55 n.4 {STEVENS,
Arguably, the Court's task now is to fashion a

workable federal common-law remedy of fraud that does not completely
negate congressional intent as manifested in the express statutory
provisions.

See Hochfelder, 425 u.s., at 210 {issue whether an

implied remedy will "nullify the effectiveness of the carefully
drawn procedural restrictions on the [] express actions")

{footnote

omitted).
{a) Merrill Lynch Test.

The line of decisions finding no

preemption since Fischman, 188 F.2d, at 786-787, provide a rule of
judicial interpretation of §lO{b) that Congress has left undisturbed
when it has amended the Securities Exchange Act.

See Merrill Lynch,

102 S.Ct., at 1841 n.66 {"'Congress is presumed to be aware of
[a] .•• judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt

~
~

that/.V~~,~-

interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change ••.• '"); ~
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 u.s., at 733 {observing that congressional ~
silence on a longstanding judicial interpretation "argues

~

significantly in favor of acceptance" of the rule by the Court).
Deft argues persuasively that Fischman was decided on principles
that are inconsistent with the development of the law of implied
~-------------------------~~--~--------------------------

remedies since Cort, but that is similar to JUSTICE POWELL's point
in Merrill Lynch, 102 u.s., at 1849, to no avail.

On the other

hand, the issue of implied §lO{b) actions is considerably more
proximate to the matters dealt with in the amendments than is the
overlap between §lO{b) and §11.

Moreover, if Congress were familiar

9.
'

.

in 1975 and 1977 with lower court authorities permitting overlapping
remedies, it should also have known of National Railroad Passenger
Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414
458 {1974)

u.s.

453,

{" [W]hen legislation expressly provides a particular

remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the
statute to subsume other remedies.").

Thus, while a strong case

could be made for the doctrine of legislative reenactment in support
of a private §lO{b) remedy, it is a much weaker case that Congress
considered the preemption or overlap issue in 1975 and 1977.
{b) Practical Considerations.

There is no evidence that

Congress intended the express remedy of §11 to provide the exclusive
method of recovery for investors defrauded in a registered
securities offering.

In §16 of the Securities Act, Congress stated

that "[t]he rights and remedies provided by this subchapter shall be
in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist

""'"'

...,.r'

---------

at law or in equity."

j(~ecurities

__..

See also 15

u.s.c.

§78b {purpose of

laws is "to impose requirements necessary to make

[securities] regulation and control reasonably complete and
effective").

The SG contends that Congress narrowed the reach of

§11 only because of its appreciation of the greatly expanded
liability imposed by that section.

Once the Court "assumes" the

existence of a private §lO{b) remedy, it is difficult to "assume"
that Congress meant for §11 to be an exclusive remedy.
Moreover, a holding that express remedies restrict the
availability of remedies under §lO(b) would impose on the federal
judiciary the burdensome task of making a detailed comparison at the
threshold of the litigation concerning the relief available to pltf

~"f~~ -

ftd.S'IJ

10.

each deft under each potent ial 'l y applicable statutory
provision.

For example, before concluding that a §11 remedy is

available, the DC
would -nave to find that the shares purchased by
_.....,. ________
--~~

pltfs were covered by and traceable to the challenged registration
~~~-·

statement.

--......._..__-----------------

In cases involving a registered offering of additional

shares of a previously traded security, tracing of shares purchased
in the aftermarket back to the registration statement can be an
extremely difficult task.

Here, if there were a dispute whether a

portion of a registration statement had been "purportedly" prepared
by deft, the parties would have to litigate that issue before
reaching the merits.

In many cases, the DC would be required to

make that analysis on the basis of the pleadings.

Finally, the

courts would have to determine which party in a §lO(b) action has
the burden of proving that pltf does or does not have a §11 remedy.

c.

Elements of §lO(b) Cause of Action

{j_5

,

Even if the Court rejects deft's argument that the actual ~

A,..z.,io

availability of express remedies precludes implied remedies,
existence of

~xpress

remedies is not irrelevant when

the ~

discuss~w~

may bring a §lO(b) action, who may be sued, and what elements he

~L~.( ·

must prove.
~ --- -

1.

i\

gl'-"p
~

Who May Sue.

Where the Court has previously addressed

issue of who may assert a recognized implied remedy, it has
emphasized the i~~~g whether the claimant~
,2within the class of persons for whose "especial" benefit the statute

~~ wa~Piper,

~ ~vr

430 U.S., at 37 (denying to a tender

offeror the right to assert a claim for private relief under
§lO(b)): Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S., at 733-736 (denying to a

11.
nonpurchaser offeree of registered securities the right to sue under
§lO(b)).

Deft argues that the structure of the Securities Act, and

the circumstances of its enactment, preclude the possibility that
Congress intended to make purchasers of securities in registered
offerings the special beneficiaries of §lO(b).
Stamps, 421

But see Blue Chip

u.s., at 733-734 (indicating purchasers are the

beneficiaries of §lO(b)).

There are three objections, however, to

precluding purchasers of registered securities from pursuing a
remedy under §lO(b).

~t,

the language of the provision does not
That
by the

~elegation

~p/1'-

of authority to the SEC to prescribe rules necessary for

the protection of "investors."

Second, the section comprehends

transactions involving any type of security: securities purchased
pursuant to a registration statement are not excluded.

Third, the

suggested approach practically eliminates the utility of the private
§lO(b) action, taking away what the precedents implying the action
purport to give.

Thus, this approach is intellectually

unsatisfying, regardless what one thinks of private §lO(b) actions.
In sum, the all-inclusive language of this provision does not easily
permit the Court to carve out an exception for defrauded purchasers
or sellers of registered securities once an implied action is found.
2. Who May Be Sued.

Unlike the ~issuer of the security, the

~igners of the registrations statement, the~irectors of the issuer,
and the~nderwriters, who are liable for material inaccuracies in
the whole of the registration statement, see 15
(2), (3)

&

u.s.c. §77k (a) (1),
tl

~'

(5), section 11 (a) (4) effectively allows accountants and
........

-

· ~wr

other experts to define for themselves

t~eadth of

-

12.
their §11

liability: An accountant is liable only for statements that

-

----------~

"purport[] to have been prepared or certified by him."

It would

seem that the Court could say that accountants and other experts
~7U~~~~~~~~~

cannot be sued under §lO(b) for aRy
_

'~statement:

f~·

se e t ~ n

o

any remedy for misstatements must come under §ll(a) (4).

This approach, however, may be precluded by the facts in Hochfelder,
which involved Ernst & Ernst.
3.

Same Restrictions. · The Securities Industry Association

argues that, if an implied remedy under §lO(b) is permitted, "it
must be subject to restrictions expressly imposed by Congress."
This seemingly straightforward solution is unsupportable.

First, if

all the procedural restrictions of §11 were appended to §lO(b), it
would become merely a §11 action with the added requirements of
scienter, reliance, and causation.

Second, if a purchaser of

securities sued under §lO(b) for conduct also actionable under both
§§11 and 12(2), it would be unclear from which express remedy to
import the procedural restrictions.
II.

Standard of Proof

If the Court finds that there is no implied remedy under §lO(b)
for the purchasers of securities in this case, there is, of course,
no reason to reach the standard-of-proof issue.
A.

Issue.

Pltfs contend that the CA's discussion of the

standard-of-evidence issue in that portion of the opinion dealing
with scienter, and the fact that the considerations supporting the
clear-and-convincing standard are primarily relevant to scienter,
indicate that the CA intended to instruct the DC only as to the

7
,

submission on retrial of the special interrogatory regarding
scienter.

Although some of the Court's discussion certainly

supports the pltfs' assertion, the CA did not expressly limit
holding~

This discussion will assume

whether pltfs must prove all elements
clear and convincing evidence.
B.

-----

Standards.

Where, as here, neither the Constitution nor

any federal statute requires any particular standard of proof, it

-

should be presumed, deft argues, that Congress intended use of the
traditional preponderance standard.
this straightforward approach.

There are two problems with

As the P.receding section indicates,

J~~~4~a<-~

implied causes of action have little to do ~ith congressional ~
intent.

"

A private §lO{b) action is meant to "supplement" the

congressional scheme by a judicially fashioned remedy, and looking
to congressional intent to define the elements of this federal
common-law fraud action is disingenuous.

More important to the

inquiry here is how the express regulatory scheme coexists with the
implied remedial scheme.
Second, it is not clear what the "traditional" standard of

~

~~

proof is in this area.

· ~·~ 1 ~roof

The Court could: {1) adopt the burden of

that applies where fraud is an element of a claim arising

~

under federal law in a nonsecurities case (clear and convincing);

~~y

{2) adopt the prevailing standard in the state courts {clear and
convincing); {3) adopt the standard of proof applicable to fraud
actions under the law of the forum state; or {4) fashion a standard
after an analysis of the particular factors in this area of the law .

.,.

14.
1.

Federal Fraud Standard.

The · preponderance of the evidence

standard is traditionally applied in civil actions.
v. Texas, 441

u.s.

418, 423-424 (1979).

See Addington

In one of its first

opinions under the federal securities laws, SEC v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320

u.s.

344, 355 (1943), this Court applied the

preponderance standard to cases brought by the SEC under §17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933--a provision that is quite similar to
rule lOb-5.
dissenting)
rule lOb-5) •

See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S., at 767 (BLACKMON, J.,
(indicating that SEC put §lO(b) and §17 together to form
~

Nevertheless, federal fraud cases have employed a
1\

I

clear and convincing standard, particularly when certain equitable
relief has been sought.

u.s.

660, 663 (1958)

See, e. g., Nowak v. United States, 356

(citizenship)

(finding of fraud requires proof

by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence); Pereira v. United
States, 347

u.s.

1, 10 (1954)

(indicating clear and convincing

standard for mail fraud statute) .

Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)

("In all \

averments of fraud ••. the circumstances constituting fraud .•• shall be

I

stated with particularity.")

~~

t1

2.

Common-~ Appr~h.

Some state courts have adopted the

reponderance standard in common-law fraud cases involving
iolations of securities or blue-sky laws.

\ 1

n Y~

~ ·

-4..

u.s.,
,.

~rts

,..---

See Capital Gains, 375

at 194 ("There has ..• been a growing recognition by common-law
that the doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed around

transactions involving land ... are ill-suited to the sale of such
intangibles as [investment] advice and securities •••• ").

Even

outside the area of securities fraud, twelve states, according to
defts, apply the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard; twenty-six

15.
states and the District of Columbia the clear-and-convincing-proof
------------~'--

-----

standard; two states apply a "preponderance of the clear and
convincing proof" standard; seven states require a standard of proof
higher than a preponderance but one not termed "clear and
convincing"; and three states apply different standards depending
whether the action is one at law or in equity.
3.

Law of Forum.

In Hochfelder, the Court observed that, in

the absence of legislative guidance concerning the contours of
§lO(b) actions, the federal courts should follow the law of

judicially implied remedies.

425

u.s.,

at 210 n.29.

Deft argues,

~ :::::e:~ :::t1::e :o::: :::::ds::::tw:e:::::r:tr::e~:::::e:han
0

~~litigation
h

/"

.

~ . J.~onfus1ng

concerning applicable statutes of limitations has been
and wasteful; there is particular difficulty with

~~borrowing when pltfs are a class; and using the law of the forum
~

Vl state also
~~objections

Bvf' --7

invites forum shopping.

On the other hand, these same

could go to the holding in Hochfelder. Moreover, it is

standard practice for plfts in private §10 (b) actions to include a
separate common-law fraud claim and a demand for jury trial.

Use of

the same standard of proof for both would reduce jury confusion.
4.

Fashioning a §lO(b) Standard.

The function of a standard

of proof is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of
confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of
factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication."

u.s. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan,
441 u.s., at 423 (requiring the

In re

Winship, 397

J., concurring).

In

Addington,

clear-and-convincing

standard before an individual could be confined indefinitely in a
mental institution), the Court stated that the determination of an
'

lt

"

appropriate standard of proof requires a balancing
,...

~

__......,__....

of~ interests

'

in

order "to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to
indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision."
The Court observed:
~

typical use of the standard is in civil cases
involving allegations of fraud or some other quasicriminal wrongdoing by the de fendant. The interests at
stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial
than mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly
reduce the risk o the defendant of havin his re utation
tarn1s ed erroneously by 1ncreas1ng the pla1ntiff's burden
of pro o f . Sim f lar iy , this Court has used the "clear,
unequivocal and convincing" standard of proof to protect
particularly important individual interests in various
civil cases. [Citing Woodby v. INS, 385 u.s. 276, 285
(1966) (deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 u.s.
350, 353 (1960) (denatural1zation); Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 u.s. 118, 159 ~ (1943) (denaturalization)] •

~ One

~~~
~

.

441

u.s, at

424.

-

The special measure of protection for deft at the

cost of increased risk of error is tolerable only when the possible
injury to deft is significantly greater than the possible harm to
the pltf.

In most civil cases, society has no interest in
s~L5

preferring one party or handicapping the other: Itslnt~rest is in
maximizing the likelihood of a correct judgment.

Although all of

the considerations discussed below do not point in one direction, it
is reasonable to conclude, as the CA did, that the interests of the
persons charged with complicity in a fraudulent distribution of
securities outweighs the interests of persons who purchased the
securities, especially in light of the fact that there is
considerable doubt that Congress intended to protect under §lO(b)
individuals who purchase registered securities.

17.
a.

TheCA based its conclusion, · at least in part, on the fact

that "judgment for the plaintiff detracts from defendant's

--

r,eputat_ign to a far greater extent than in other civil litigation."

I Cf.

Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S., at 739 (finding the "vexatiousness"

of §lO(b) litigation to be "different in degree and in kind" from
that of other litigation).

Pltfs argue that the possible opprobrium

to a deft that may result from an adverse private §lO(b) decision
clearly falls far short of the extraordinary interests that warrant
the clear-and-convincing standard of proof, and that the interests
of deft, who has allegedly participated intentionally in the
fraudulent sale of securities to the public, do not outweigh the
interests of those who purchased the securities, the very
individuals whom the federal securities laws are intended to
protect.

Deft argues that it is a small firm of certified public

accountants, and the effect on its reputation of a fraud judgment
predicated on findings that it acted with intent to deceive or
defraud investors would be ruinous.
~

The SG argues that deft's

general interest in protecting its reputation in a case brought
under the federal securities laws is not substantially different
from the interest of defts in other civil proceedings, such as
antitrust or civil rights actions, in which violations of federal
statutes are alleged and in which the preponderance standard
applies.

See Vance v. Terrazas, 444

u.s.

252, 266-267 (1980)

(preponderance standard applies to expatriation proceeding).

~ C~ v ~~

It seems that the SG undervalues a professional's

b

The other reason offered by the CAS to justify imposition

~ ~~~he. clear-and-convincing

\l~~.>;vO ·

i)'-- /_,)Y v ~~

?~/

~

reputation. ~!

standard is that "proof of intent to

deceive is often a matter of inference ..•• "

Although theCA held

that a clear-and-convincing standard should have been applied, it
also held that the evidence was sufficent under that standard to
permit a finding that each deft acted with intent to deceive.

The

CA supported its holding by references to "expert testimony that
[deft] was, to some degree, negligent in its accounting procedures";
to deft's "involvement" in the preparation of the Use of Proceeds
section of the prospectus; and to deft's refusal to give a comfort
letter to the underwriters referring to the construction costs in
the prospectus, a matter arguably beyond the competence of
accountants and auditors.

Deft contends that, if §lO(b) 's scienter

requirement, cf. Hochfelder, 425 U.S., at 194 n.l2 (leaving open
whether reckless behavior will establish liability), may be
satisfied under a clear-and-convincing standard by so insubstantial
a body of evidence, it is fearful to imagine the quality of evidence
necessary to establish scienter under a preponderance-of-theevidence standard.

But cf. Vance, 444

u.s.,

at 267 (noting that

pltf's duty to prove a state-of-mind element was "in itself ..• a
heavy burden" that militates in favor of using the preponderance
standard of proof).
c.

l~

In addition, the CAS's decision creates somewhat of an

,__--

anomaly when read in the light of this Court's decision in Steadman

-~-evidence
v. SEC, 450

~brought

u.s.

91 (1981), which held that the preponderance-of-

standard applies in SEC administrative proceedings

pursuant to §9(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and

§203(f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

~
- ~-~
~ ~~aseu -its

Because the Court

holding on an interpretation of §7(c) of the APA, Steadman

is distinguishable from the present case.
CAS's ruling, a deft in an SEC

proceed~ng

Nevertheless, under the
would be afforded only a

preponderance standard, but in a private §lO(b) case the same deft
would be afforded the higher standard, even though the potential
harm to a deft from an erroneous decision in an SEC administrative
proceeding where his business and livelihood are at risk could be
greater than in a private §lO(b) action.
d.

Different standards of proof for private suits and for

agency actions may also hinder the efficient disposition of
securities litigation by sometimes foreclosing use of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel.

In Parkline Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439

u.s.

322 (1979), this Court held that a private pltf could collaterally ~
estop a deft from relitigating issues previously decided in an
action brought by the SEC.

Arguably, collateral estoppel may be

used only if the standard in the first proceeding is as stringent as
the standard in the subsequent proceeding.
Summary
1.

I recommend that you once again "assume" the existence of

§lO(b) remedies for purposes of addressing the questions presented.
2.

While the existence of express remedies is compelling

evidence that no private remedy should be implied, I believe it is a
I I

\'

poor rationale for limiting existing implied remedies. The
~
~...................
...,
rationale cannot be limited to situations where there is an express
remedy: the existence of other remedies does not indicate
congressional intent any more than does the absence of remedies.
Most important, the judicial costs of deciding whether an express
remedy is available in every §lO(b) case to eliminate only a few

20.

poorly pleaded cases are not justified·: ·It would not eliminate the
case before the Court.

The only principled alternatives are (1)

reject defendant's limitation or (2) definitively state that the
remedies available under federal securities laws are only those
expressly created by Congress.

Protection against unwarranted

imposition of liability may be better obtained through faithful
application of this Court's prior decisions defining the elements of
a private §10 (b)

action.(J!~. ~ )

Having said that, some thought should be give to stating simply
that there is no private §lO(b) remedy.

As this case so well

indicates, it is very difficult to "limit" the remedy once it is
----------~~

assumed to exist.

The area is sufficiently messy to permit you to

say that no private §lO(b) remedy will be implied under any

~

.' P

~~t
rvn

circumstances, and if you are so inclined, there is no better case .
3.

It is difficult to square the limitations suggested in this

case concerning who may sue, who may be sued, or what the elements
of a private §lO(b) action may be with precedent.
4.

The standard-of-proof issue is

persuasive arguments on all sides.

~

close~re

j;>'-

~

The §lO(b) remedy, however, is

for all purposes a federal common-law fraud action.

I see no reason

why a uniform rule here is any more necessary than it would have
been in Hochfelder and would opt for the standard of the forum
state.

If the Court decides to fashion its own standard, the

disfavored use of private §lO(b) remedies, as well as the risk to
reputation in any fraud case, counsel for adoption of the clear-and-

co~. ~
5.

'·

I would affirm.

lfp/ss 09/13/82
MEMORANOUM
TO:

Jim Browning

FROM:

Lewis P. Powell, Jr.

Sept. 13, 1982

DATE:

81-680 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston
I read your excellent memorandum o'rer the
and found it extremely helpful.

This is an area in which I

am particularly interested - as you know
written in "implied action" cases.
inclined to agree with you,

weekend, ~-

from what I have

I am tentatively

howev~r,

as to the correct

analysis and disposition of this case.
With respect to the "clear and convincinq"
standard (\ol"'ich ! am inclined to think should be
a federal rule), I
personal.

somewh~t

~ake

ado~ted

as

the followinq observations -

My first

in corporate as

exnerienc~

distinguished from trial practice was in the
of Virginia investment banking firms.

!

repr~Aentation

therefore have some

familiari.ty with the Securities Acts, and Also with thf> way
in which they have been administeren.

Generally, I think

these acts have heen amonq the best of the requlatory
statutes.
reach.

But the SEC always has sought to exoand its

The history of lOb-5 is an example.
In balancing the "equities" or policy

considerations relevant to the standard of proof, I also
know from my corporate experience in the latter years of my
practice that the increase in damaqe suits has certain

"•'

·~

2.

negative effects in addition to those identified in your
memorandum.
The typical private damages action under the
Securities Acts takes place several years after the alleqed
fraud.

There are bankrupt companiP.s today that, only a year

or two aqo, were widely viewed as fine invPstments.

~urors

- and indeed judges - tend to be influenced by the present
rather than conditions existing at the time of the alleged
fraud.

Information that may not. have seemed important then

can loom quite large years

l~ter.

'i'he number of suits have

multiplied, and sometimes damaqes have been larqe and - as
your memorandum noted - reputations destroyed.
One consequence of all of this is that many of the
ablest people in our country no lonqer will serve on boards
of directors.

I know thls from personal experience.

l!!ven

insurance covering directors is usually limited to
negligence and not fraud.

Premiums are high, an expense

consumers ultimately pay.

Our baste economic system - the

free enterprise system - is a "risk" system and investors
should not expect quaranteed equity investments in
part i.cular.
Against thi.s background, if the following
information is readily obtainable on Lexis it might be
interesting, and

poss~bly

relevant to the standard of proof:

How many lOb cases have there been since Fleschman was
decided in 1951?
years?

.

.

Has the number accelerated in recent

Will Lexis identify suits filed against various

3.

categories of defendants:

persons who sign registration

statements, officers and directors,· underwriters, experts particularly accounting firms.

My impression is that a good

many small accounting firms no longer will work on
registration statements.
In the literature in this area, is there any
discussion that has come to your attention as to the public
interest that may be adversely affected by opening the field
wide to damage suits that have never been expressly
authorized by Congress.
I do not want you to commit any substantial amount
of time to this.

Get as much help as you can from the

library.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

..,

job 09/29/82

To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re: Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, No. 81-680

You asked if in the literature there is any discussion as to
the public interest that may be adversely affected by opening the
securities field wide open to damage suits
expressly authorized by Congress.

t~ave

never been

I hope the following list

addresses your inquiry and proves helpful.

I have copies of the

articles in my office if you wish to see any of them.

Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 Va. L. Rev.
553, 577-578 {1981)
Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment
Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 Va. L. Rev.
776, 840-842 {1972)
Note, Rule lOb-5: The Rejection
Doctrine by Eason~ General
Corp. and the Need for a New
Damages, 1974 Duke L.J. 610,

of the Birnbaum
Motors Acceptance
Limitation on
628-631

7o

job 10/31/82

To: Mr. Justice Powell
From: Jim
Re: Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, No. 81-680
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, No. 81-1076

You asked for statistics on:
decided since Fleschman (1951):
accelerated in recent years:

(1) the number of lOb cases

(2) whether the number has

(3) who the defts were in those cases.

The research librarian helping me on this project had hopes at first
that this information would be available from the SEC.
since learned that such is not the case.

She has

She has also informed me

that she thinks it would be impossible to retrieve the information
from Lex.i s.

It would require a case-by-case examination of over

1500 cases per year (in recent years).
Do you have any suggestions?

' .

~

---

81-6 80 HERMAN & MacLEAN v. HUDDLESTON
81-1076 HUDDLESTON v. HERMAN & MacLEAN

Argued 11/9/82
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November ll, 1982

81-680 Herman & ~acLean v. Huddleston
Hm::1dleston v. Herman & Maci,ean

~h-10'6

Oeat Ghief:
I have decided tentatively to
case for the following reason:

re~ain

out of this

Our oldest daughter lives in HouAton, where her
husband is a.n officer (or partner:?} of Rotan-Mosle Co., a
leading T~xa~ investment banking f.tr.m that has be~n
prominent in underwriting issues related to the oil
industry. My understan~ing is that one or more of these
issues •went sour" with the general c·o llapae of. oil-related
securities.

•

Our lfaughter has told me that her husband,
toqether with Rotan-Mosle and I suppose other officials, are
being sued for alleged Securities Act violations. I have
not discussed the matter with our son-i.n-lBw, but it is Bafe
to assume that the customary claims - similar to those in
the above case - are being made.
t euppos., lt is possible that pending litigation
involving our son-in-law could be settled before our case is
brought down. In that event, I could join in the decision
of the case. Otherwise, I think it best for me to remain
out.

Sincerely,

'··

The Chief ,Justice

lfp/ss

...; . 1

81-680
No. 81-1076

The Chief Justice

Justice Brennan

Justice White

Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston
, Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean

Conf. 11/12/82

Justice Marshall

Justice Blackmun

Justice Powell

Justice Rehnquist

Justice Stevens

Justice O'Connor

.§upuntt <!Jattrlaf f1r.t ~t.tb' ~brl.tg
:Jfaglfin.gtcn. ~. OJ. 2llc?J!-'
CHANBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 30, 1982

Re:

81-680 - Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston;
and 81-1076 - Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

<!fttttrl o-f tfrt ~uittb ~htttg
~IUlfrin.gtott. ~· <!f. 2.(Jc?)l.'

.:§eyunu

CHAMBERS OF

January 3, 1983

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re: No. 81-680 - Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston
No. 81-1076 - Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean
Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

.iutrrttttt QJL11td ttf t~ t 1!inittlt .i hdt,tt

'J!Jia.s'qhtgton, ~. <!f.

2llgt't~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

January 10, 1983

No. 81-680 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston
No. 81-1076 Huddleston v. Her~an & MacLean

Dear Thurgood,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall

Copies to the Conference

.iu.prtuU

Qfottrl of tltt ~b ,.:§ta!t.G

._ufringLtn, ~. ~· 2!l?Jt~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

January 17, 1983

Re:

81-680, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston
81-1076, Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean

Dear Thurgood:
I join.

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

~u:prrntt

{!fonrl of tlft ~tb ;§tatfg
'~htilfrhtghm. ~. <i 20.?'1-~

v

CHAM!3ERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 19, 1983
Re:

No. 81-680 )
No. 81-1076)

Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean

Dear Thurgood:
You said at Conference last week that it would be a close
question whether the Chief or I were the last to join your
opinion.
I see · I now have that honor, and want to commend
you for the outstanding piece of work you have done in this
case.

Sincerely/

Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference
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